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CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Fictitious Payee After Teva v. BMO: Has the
Pendulum Swung Back Far Enough?
Benjamin Geva*
Under Section 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act1 (‘‘BEA s. 20(5)”) where on
a bill of exchange ‘‘the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill may be
treated as payable to bearer.” A bill of exchange includes a cheque.2 Where BEA
s. 20(5) applies to a cheque, its effect is to reallocate forged endorsement losses
from banks involved in the collection and payment of the cheque to the drawer. 3
Quite recently, in commenting on Raza Kayani LLP v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,4
I highlighted the ongoing confusion in the judicial interpretation of BEA s. 20(5)5
(‘‘Kayani Comment”). That comment does not appear to have been available to
the judges of the Ontario Court of Appeal in subsequently rendering their
judgement in Teva Canada Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal6 (‘‘Teva”). At the same time,
in invoking a policy rationale, in addition to relying on a precedent,7 the Court in
Teva acknowledged my position as had been already expressed in a previous
writing on the subject.8 It thus recognized that as regards to cheque fraud
committed by an insider in and on a corporate9 drawer BEA s. 20(5) is to be
*
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Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School York University; Counsel, Torys LLP,
Toronto.
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4.
Under BEA, ibid., s. 165 (1), ‘‘A cheque is a bill drawn on a bank, payable on demand.”
Under BEA ibid. s. 2, ‘‘bill means bill of exchange”.
Briefly stated this is so since the bearer is the holder of a bill payable to bearer (BEA, ibid.,
s. 2, ‘holder’ defined) and payment to the holder ‘‘made at or after the maturity of the bill
to the holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title to the bill is defective”
discharges the bill. BEA, ibid., s. 138. Conversely when a cheque payable to order is paid
over a forged endorsement, the taker from the forger is not the holder so that loss falls on
the taker from the forger, typically the collecting bank. See BEA, ibid., ss. 48-49, in
conjunction with s. 59(3).
2014 ONCA 862, 2014 CarswellOnt 16810, 14 C.C.L.T. (4th) 175, 378 D.L.R. (4th) 729,
328 O.A.C. 229 (Ont. C.A.).
Benjamin Geva, ‘‘The Fictitious Payee Strikes Again: The Continuing Misadventures of
BEA s. 20(5)”, (2015) 30 BFLR 573 [Kayani Comment].
2016 ONCA 94, 2016 CarswellOnt 1483, 129 O.R. (3d) 1, 394 D.L.R. (4th) 298, 344
O.A.C. 344 (Ont. C.A.).
Rouge Valley Health System v. TD Canada Trust, 2012 ONCA 17, 2012 CarswellOnt 255,
108 O.R. (3d) 561, 287 O.A.C. 241 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 11.
Benjamin Geva, ‘‘Conversion of Unissued Cheques and the Fictitious or Non-Existing
Payee — Boma v. CIBC”, 28 CBLJ 177 at 195.
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interpreted as allocating losses to ‘‘the drawer, who typically is better positioned
to discover the fraud or insure against it.”10 Accordingly, the Court in Teva
distinguished Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce11 (‘‘Boma”) and thus restored a measure of consistency between law
and good policies.
In Teva,
Between 2003 and 2006, McConachie [an employee in Teva’s finance
department] requisitioned numerous cheques payable to six entities he
designated. Two of the entities had names he invented; the other four
were current or former customers of Teva. None of the entities was
owed any money by Teva. The cheques were issued by Teva’s accounts
payable department and given to McConachie, even though he had no
authority either to requisition cheques or approve payments to
customers and Teva’s own internal approval policies had been
ignored.12

All cheques were collected by the fraudster and his accomplices in accounts
opened in the name of sole proprietorships registered under Ontario’s Business
Names Act.13 Teva sued the collecting banks in conversion. Regrettably,
assertion by the banks of the drawer’s negligence did not go anywhere, 14
notwithstanding the availability of a helpful precedent,15 so that the case had to
be decided as a matter of interpretation of BEA s. 20(5).
In the Kayani Comment16 I argued that the misadventures of BEA s. 20(5)
have been caused by the judicial focus on the meaning of ‘fictitious or nonexisting’ instead of on the policy rationale for allocating certain fraud losses onto
a defrauded drawer. Interestingly, in Teva, ploughing his way through a web of
9
10
11
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15

16

‘Corporate’ is used here broadly and loosely to denote any organization.
Teva, supra note 6, at para. 34.
1996 CarswellBC 2314, 1996 CarswellBC 2315, EYB 1996-67134, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, 27
B.C.L.R. (3d) 203, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 463, [1997] 2 W.W.R. 153, 82 B.C.A.C. 161, 203
N.R. 321, 133 W.A.C. 161, [1996] S.C.J. No. 111 (S.C.C.).
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 2.
R.S.O. 1990, c. B17.
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 28, citing an earlier proceeding in the same case: Teva Canada
Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2012 ONCA 486, 2012 CarswellOnt 8505, 353 D.L.R. (4th)
326, (sub nom. Teva Canada Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal) 294 O.A.C. 323 (Ont. C.A.) at
paras. 19 and 20; leave to appeal refused 2013 CarswellOnt 490, 2013 CarswellOnt 491,
(sub nom. Teva Canada Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal) 446 N.R. 399 (note), (sub nom. Teva
Canada Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal) 309 O.A.C. 400 (note) (S.C.C.).
Royal Bank v. Socie´te´ Ge´nérale (Canada), 2006 CarswellOnt 8091, 31 B.L.R. (4th) 63,
219 O.A.C. 83, [2006] O.J. No. 5081 (Ont. C.A.); additional reasons 2007 ONCA 302,
2007 CarswellOnt 2370, 31 B.L.R. (4th) 83 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2007
CarswellOnt 5676, 2007 CarswellOnt 5677, 376 N.R. 400 (note), 245 O.A.C. 400 (note),
[2007] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.); leave to appeal refused 2007 CarswellOnt 5678, 2007
CarswellOnt 5679, 377 N.R. 400 (note), 246 O.A.C. 400 (note) (S.C.C.).
Supra note 5 at 589-592.
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often conflicting precedents and bound by policy-devoid judgements of a higher
instance, Laskin JA nevertheless reached a result defensible on policy grounds.
I will resist the temptation to rewrite the Kayani Comment,17 but will
consider this case note as a sequel or addendum to it. I will thus endeavour to
examine Teva and its impact in the context of the evolution of Canadian law in
the judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada in Royal Bank v. Concrete
Column Clamps (1961) Ltd.18 (‘‘Concrete Column Clamps”) and Boma.19 For my
broader analysis, which is not affected by this case note, I direct the reader to the
Kayani Comment.20
In Teva,21 as in the earlier cases, the starting point was:
. . . four propositions taken from the late Dean John D. Falconbridge’s
influential book, Banking and Bills of Exchange, 6th Ed. (Toronto:
Canada Law Book, 1956) at 468-9:
(1) If the payee is not the name of any real person known to the drawer,
but is merely that of a creature of the imagination, the payee is nonexisting, and is probably also fictitious.
(2) If the drawer for some purpose of his own inserts as payee the name
of a real person who was known to him but whom he knows to be dead,
the payee is non-existing, but is not fictitious.
(3) It the payee is the name of a real person known to the drawer, but
the drawer names him as payee by way of pretence, not intending that
he should receive payment, the payee is fictitious, but is not nonexisting.
(4) If the payee is the name of a real person, intended by the drawer to
receive payment, the payee is neither fictitious nor nonexisting,
notwithstanding that the drawer has been induced to draw the bill by
the fraud of some other person who has falsely represented to the
drawer that there is a transaction in respect of which the payee is
entitled to the sum mentioned in the bill.

In Teva,22 the collecting banks argued that the case was covered by the first
proposition, while Teva argued that the fourth proposition applied.23
17
18

19
20
21
22
23

Ibid.
1976 CarswellQue 45, 1976 CarswellQue 45F, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 456, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 26, 8
N.R. 451 (S.C.C.), where the issue was characterized, at para. 1, as ‘‘a new one for [the
SCC] but an old one in the law of negotiable instruments.”
Supra note 11.
Supra note 5.
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 35.
Ibid.
Ibid. at paras. 38 and 39.
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In Rouge Valley Health System v. TD Canada Trust,24 (‘‘Rouge Valley”)
Laskin JA summarized Falconbridge’s distinction between ‘fictitious’ and ‘nonexisting’ in BEA s. 20(5)25 as follows:
* Whether the payee is non-existing is a simple question of fact not
depending on anyone’s intention.
*Whether the payee is fictitious depends upon the intention of the
drawer of the ... cheque.

This interpretation was adhered to in Concrete Column Clamps.26 However,
in Boma, the Supreme Court of Canada,
appeared to treat non-existing and fictitious payees interchangeably.
And, instead of adhering to Falconbridge’s explanation of ‘‘nonexisting” as a question of objective fact, Iacobucci J. imported the
notion of ‘‘plausibility” into the question whether a payee is nonexisting. The effect of his modification is that even if a payee is, in fact,
a creature of the fraudster’s imagination, the payee may still not be
non-existing if the drawer had a plausible and honest, though mistaken,
belief that the payee was a real creditor of the drawer’s business.27

As well,
In Boma at para. 40, Iacobucci J. said that the relevant intent for
determining whether a payee is fictitious, is the intent of the drawer
itself, not the intent of the actual ‘‘creator of the instrument.”28

Prior to Boma, in implementing Falconbridge’s distinction, there appeared to
be a consensus that a cheque payable to a non-existing person falls under BEA s.
20(5), no matter under whose fraudulent design the cheque was made out. In
Boma, Iacobucci J. undermined this consensus by excluding the cheque from
BEA s. 20(5), where on the basis of the similarity between the (imaginary) payee’s
name and a real creditor of the drawer, the drawer’s guiding mind29 had a
plausible and honest, though mistaken, belief that the payee was a real creditor
of the drawer’s business. For ‘plausibility’ to exclude a cheque from the coverage
of BEA s. 20(5), a guiding mind must have seen the cheque (or approved its
24
25

26
27
28
29

Supra note 7 at para. 23.
The distinction in the original language, Falconbridge text that follows supra note 21 at
468 is as follows: Whether a named payee is non-existing is a simple question of fact, not
depending on anyone’s intention. The question whether the payee is fictitious depends
upon the intention of the creator of the instrument, that is, the drawer of a bill or cheque
or the maker of a note.
Supra note 18.
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 41.
Ibid. at para. 59.
A broad term loosely denoting an organ or someone with managerial as opposed to mere
signatory authority.
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issuance), so that due to the similarity between the imaginary name and the name
of a real creditor (past or present), it is plausible that the guiding mind thought
the cheque was payable to a real creditor. There is no need to prove that a
guiding mind truly thought so; what is, however, required is proof of cheque
examination and approval.
As for fictitiousness, where according to Falconbridge’s principles 30 it is the
drawer’s intention that matters, it is agreed that the relevant time for the intent to
exist is that of the writing of the cheque.31 What has been disputed, however, is
whose intent determines the drawer’s intention in case of a corporate drawer. The
majority in Concrete Column Clamps32 (Pigoen J.) identified the actual signer as
the ‘creator’ of the cheque whose intention mattered as to whether the cheque
was payable to a fictitious payee. This was followed by LaForest J. in his
dissenting judgment in Boma.33 For his part, in his dissent in Concrete Column
Clamps,34 Laskin CJC35 thought that the creator of a cheque whose intention
mattered was the moving force behind its writing, that is, the fraudster who
either signed or supplied to the signer the payee’s name with the intent to
appropriate its proceeds. For Laskin CJC, the intention of an innocent signer
who was effectively misled by the fraudster did not matter. Accordingly, in the
case of an internal fraud at a corporate drawer’s organization, carried by one
who is neither the signer nor a guiding mind, under Laskin CJC’s dissent in
Concrete Column Clamps,36 cheques payable to an existing person who is not
intended by the fraudster to be paid will be payable to a fictitious payee, and loss
with respect to them will fall on the corporate drawer. At the same time,
according to Iacobucci J. in Boma,37 even where the fraudster is the signer, the
cheques will not be payable to a fictitious person, as long as the signer is not a
guiding mind of the corporate drawer.
Giving the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Teva, Laskin JA appeared to
be sympathetic to the criticism against Boma.38 However, sitting at a Court of
Appeal of a Province, he was not in a position to reverse a judgement of the
Supreme Court of Canada. Instead, he distinguished Boma. For Boma to apply,
Laskin JA required actual ‘corporate intent’ in the cheque writing, something he
did not find to exist in Teva, where ‘‘[c]lerks processed the cheques and
mechanically applied signing officers’ signatures‘‘ and did not ‘‘turn their minds
to the names on the requisitions or the cheques.” 39 Contrary to Teva’s express
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

See text that follows supra note 25.
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 60 (referring to the drawing of the cheque).
Supra note 18.
Supra note 11.
Supra note 18.
Who is of course other than Laskin JA who gave the judgement in Teva, supra note 6.
Supra note 18.
Supra note 11.
The extensive literature is cited e.g. in the Kayani Comment, supra note 5 at 593 at fn 94.
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policy, cheques were not approved prior to release,40 so that no corporate intent
to issue them could have been facilitated.41 In the process, Laskin JA expanded
the result of Concrete Column Clamps so as effectively to follow the dissenting
view of Laskin CJC, albeit without explicitly adopting his reasoning that was not
adopted by the Concrete Column Clamps majority.
Effectively Laskin JA held in Teva that to override the application of
Falconbridge’s first proposition, so as to exclude a case from the coverage of
BEA s. 20(5), there must be, at least on the basis of ‘plausibility,’ a specific
corporate intent to pay the payee whose name is ‘‘merely that of a creature of the
imagination.”42 Similarly, for the fourth proposition to apply, so as to exclude a
case from the coverage of BEA s. 20(5), corporate intent is needed to pay the ‘real
person’. In the facts of the case, he concluded, the first proposition was not
overridden and the fourth proposition did not apply so that all cheques
requisitioned by the fraudster were covered by BEA s. 20(5) and the entire loss
fell on Teva.43
By reference to Falconbridge’s view that non-existence is objective while
fictitiousness is subjectively determined,44 there is a question as to whether these
two categories are mutually exclusive. In the Kayani Comment I answered in the
affirmative,45 not only on the basis of the language of BEA s. 20(5), speaking of a
payee who is ‘‘a fictitious or non-existing person” [emphasis added]. Rather, once
a payee is a ‘non-existing person’ nothing is to be gained by describing him or her
to be also ‘fictitious’. Whether a person is ‘fictitious’ matters only once s/he is
‘existing.’46 However, in his first proposition Falconbridge does not mind
treating a non-existing person, creature of the drawer’s imagination, as
‘‘probably also fictitious.” 47 Arguably inasmuch as this is confusing,
nevertheless it is not harmful. Since the Court in Teva did not mind the

39
40
41

42

43

44
45
46
47

Teva, supra note 6 at para. 53. See also at para. 75.
Ibid. at paras. 12-13. See also at para. 53.
This allowed Laskin JA to distinguish (at paras. 80-82) Metroland Printing, Publishing &
Distribution Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2001 CarswellOnt 1518, 14
B.L.R. (3d) 212, [2001] O.T.C. 330, [2001] O.J. No. 1695 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]);
affirmed 2002 CarswellOnt 956, 158 O.A.C. 111 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2003
CarswellOnt 436, 2003 CarswellOnt 437, 307 N.R. 400 (note), 180 O.A.C. 400 (note)
(S.C.C.).
For the first proposition (and all others) see Teva, supra note 6 at para. 35 (as well as text
that follows supra note 21).
First point (as to Falconbridge’s first proposition) is addressed primarily in Teva, supra
note 6 at para. 48-57, while the second (as to Falconbridge’s fourth proposition) is
addressed primarily at paras. 58-75.
See text that follows supra note 25.
Supra note 5 at 578-79.
As in fact acknowledged by Laskin JA at Teva, supra note 6 at para. 58.
See text that follows supra note 21.
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possibility that a ‘non-existing’ person will also be ‘fictitious’, 48 in this case note I
will go along with this position.
The following is then the evolution of the interpretation of BEA s. 20(5),
point by point, in a nutshell:
Concrete Column Clamps49
1. BEA s. 20(5) applies to a corporate drawer only in the case of a cheque
signed by an authorized signer;
Comment
There is neither disagreement nor variation on this point.

Concrete Column Clamps50
2. BEA s. 20(5) applies where the fraudster is the authorized signer of the
cheque, in which case the payee is always fictitious, whether his name is of
a real or imaginary person;
Qualified by Boma51
This is true only where a guiding mind of the corporate drawer is the
fraudster. Such was the case in Fok Cheong Shing Investments Ltd. v.
Bank of Nova Scotia52 where the fraudulent guiding mind signed the
cheque. At the same time, no matter who (among authorized signers)
signed the cheque, where the fraudster is not a guiding mind the payee is
not ‘fictitious,’ since there is no corporate intent to defraud by making the
cheque not payable to a genuine creditor. Whether the payee is
nevertheless ‘non-existing’ depends on the ensuing rule 3(a).
Boma qualification is narrowed in Teva53
For Boma54 qualification to apply, a corporate drawer’s guiding mind
must actually turn his or her mind to the payee’s name at the time the
cheque was drawn. Where no ‘‘responsible officers scrutinized or even
looked at any of the fraudulent cheques,” ‘‘no inference of a corporate
intent to pay legitimate creditors should be drawn.”55

48
49
50
51
52

53
54
55

See e.g. Teva, supra note 6 at para. 36.
Supra note 18.
Ibid.
Supra note 11.
1982 CarswellOnt 735, 1982 CarswellOnt 735F, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 488, 146 D.L.R. (3d) 617,
46 N.R. 181 (S.C.C.).
Supra note 6.
Supra note 11.
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 75.
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Concrete Column Clamps56
3. In a ‘payroll padding’ scenario, that is where the fraudster is the one who
prepares cheques, or provides the list of payees, and is relied upon by the
ultimate signer, no cheque is payable to a fictitious payee. This is so
because the authorized signer intended all cheques to be payable to the
named payees. However, since ‘existence’ is an objective fact, cheques may
be payable to non-existing persons, so as to fall under BEA s. 20(5). Stated
otherwise,
(a) Whether the payee is a non-existing person is determined objectively.
Hence, BEA s. 20(5) applies and the loss falls on the corporate drawer. A
cheque payable to a payee who is either [known to be?]57 dead or
imaginary falls into this category. A cheque is payable to an imaginary
payee when it is payable to the name of a person with no connection to the
drawer, particularly, not to a creditor of the drawer as for example, an
employee. The name of a non-existing person may be that of a literary,
historical or public figure. As well, the name could randomly be picked
from the telephone directory or any other source. It could thus be the
name of a real person, even of someone known to the fraudster, who is
nevertheless ‘non-existing’ because he or she has no connection with the
drawer. While a real person who is alive certainly exists, as far as the
corporate drawer is concerned,58 he or she is just a name, and hence ‘nonexisting.’ In the payroll padding scenario, the intent of the honest
authorized signer to benefit the payee is irrelevant, since the test for being
‘non-existing’ is determined objectively;
Qualified in Boma59
This is not so where the payee’s name is sufficiently similar to a name of a
legitimate creditor of the drawer so that the imaginary name might
plausibly be identified by the corporate drawer’s guiding mind as being a
real creditor of his/her business.

56
57

58
59

Supra note 18.
Of course, the bracketed language undermines the objective nature of the test. Also,
known to whom?
This qualification is another drawback to the alleged objective nature of the test.
In the language of Laskin JA in Teva, supra note 6 at fn 2 (para. 41): ‘‘This modification
has been criticized. See the persuasive dissenting reasons of LaForest J. in Boma; Geva,
supra [footnote 8] and Crawford and Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Exchange
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1986) s. 4902.3(i) at p. 1254.”

CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

615

Boma60 qualification is narrowed in Teva61
For Boma62 qualification to apply, the drawer must have actually
considered the payee’s name on the cheque, and ‘‘because of the similarity
in name, [it is at least plausible that the drawer] had an honest, though
mistaken, belief that the named payee was a real [creditor].”63 Where
there is no evidence of anyone other than the fraudster, not being a
guiding mind, ‘‘turning a mind to the names of the payees on the cheques
at the time they were drawn,”64 Boma qualification does not apply so that
the cheque is governed by BEA s. 21(5) as payable to a non-existing
person and loss falls on the corporate drawer.

Concrete Column Clamps65
(b) Conversely, whether the payee is a fictitious person is determined
subjectively, from the viewpoint of the signer (creator of the instrument).
Stated otherwise, a ‘fictitious’ person may be ‘existing. Employees and
other creditors of the drawer, whether past or present, are ‘existing’, and
from the point of view of the fraudster, are fictitious. Where they are not
owed any legitimate debt,66 the fraudster may implement his or her
fraudulent design by either requisitioning or signing cheques payable to
them. However, to bring the situation into the ambit of BEA s. 20(5), and
on this point, notwithstanding Laskin CJC’s position to the contrary, 67
the fraudster must be an authorized signer who actually signed them;
where the fraudster is not the signer, his or her intention does not matter.
Rather, since in the payroll padding scenario, cheques payable to the
names of former employees/creditors are intended by the honest
authorized signing officer to be paid to them, they cannot be said to be
payable to ‘fictitious’ persons. Nor, as discussed, are they payable to nonexisting persons. Accordingly, BEA s. 20(5) does not apply and the
corporate drawer does not bear the loss.

60
61
62
63

64
65
66

67

Supra note 11.
Supra note 6.
Supra note 11.
Teva, supra note 6 at para. 50. See also Teva at para. 44 citing Bradley Crawford, The Law
of Banking and Payment in Canada (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008) at 22-34.
Teva, ibid. at para. 57.
Supra note 18.
Otherwise, a creditor who is owed money is likely to complain for not receiving payment
and thereby expose the fraudulent scheme. Hence, it will be a foolish mistake for the
fraudster, in implementing his or her fraudulent design, to use the name of such a
creditor.
See text around supra notes 34-36.
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Modified in Boma68
The determining intent for fictitiousness is that of the drawer’s guiding
mind and not that of the signing officer — where the latter is not a guiding
mind.
Teva’s69 application of Boma70
To fit into Falconbridge’s fourth proposition71 covering the case in which
‘‘the payee is the name of a real person, intended by the drawer to receive
payment” so that ‘‘the payee is neither fictitious nor nonexisitng” — the
named payee must be intended by a guiding mind of the drawer to receive
payment. In such a case BEA s. 20(5) does not apply and the loss falls on
the drawer. Otherwise, where no guiding mind intends to make the
payment to the real person the fourth proposition does not apply.

Teva’s72 treatment of Falconbridge’s fourth proposition73 is, however,
problematic. This is so inasmuch as this treatment suggests that a case not
covered by Falconbridge’s fourth proposition automatically falls into the ambit
of BEA s. 20(5). This, however, does not seem to be what was envisioned by
Falconbridge. In terms of his four propositions,74 to be covered by BEA s. 20(5),
in circumstances where the payee cannot be said to be non-existing, so as not fall
into one of the first two Falconbridge’s propositions, the case must still be within
the scope of Falconbridge’s third proposition. Such is the case where the drawer,
that is according to Boma,75 the drawer’s guiding mind, names the payee who is
known to him or her, merely ‘‘by way of pretence, not intending that [the named
payee] should receive payment.”76 Certainly, such was not the case in Teva;77
Laskin JA must then be understood to say that for BEA s. 20(5) to apply to a
fictitious payee, suffice it for the corporate drawer’s guiding mind not to intend
to pay the designate payee. This appears to be quite a stretched application of
Boma.78
Thus, distinguishing Boma,79 the Court effectively expanded the application
of BEA s. 20(5) and found it to apply in Teva80 to all cheques generated by the
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Supra note 11.
Supra note 6.
Supra note 11.
See text that follows supra note 21.
Supra note 6.
See text that follows supra note 21.
Ibid.
Supra note 11.
See text that follows supra note 21.
Supra note 6.
Supra note 11.
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fraudster. Consequently, the entire loss fell on Teva and not on the collecting
banks. The outcome was the same as that reached by Laskin CJC in his dissent in
Concrete Column Clamps.81 However, Laskin CJC reasoned that the drawer’s
intent is determined by the intent of the fraudster rather than that of the signer.
In light of the majority decision in Concrete Column Clamps,82 this option was
not available to Laskin JA in Teva,83 who thus based his decision on the lack of
intent by a guiding mind to pay to the real creditor.
Interestingly, in Teva, Laskin JA stated his conclusion not to depend on an
allocation of fault:
It is not Teva’s negligence for which it is found liable, but rather its lack
of corporate knowledge and therefore the absence of any evidence from
which one could reasonably infer it intended to pay real creditors of its
business for legitimate debts.84

Nevertheless, ‘lack of corporate knowledge’ was found on the basis the lack
of implementation of cheque approval polices; ‘‘had Teva followed its own
approval policies and mistakenly approved the fraudulent cheques”, Laskin JA
‘‘would have inferred a corporate intent to pay real creditors for legitimate
obligations.”85 Indeed, cheque approval may not suffice to discharge a duty of
care requiring even tighter office procedures;86 at the same time, fastening on the
drawer loss caused by the absence of cheque approval acknowledges that fault
and loss minimization policies underlie Teva.87
Teva88 is a clear judicial acknowledgement as to the fact that Boma89 did not
follow existing law. In nevertheless following Boma,90 Laskin JA convincingly
limited its application to the non-existing payee, and stretched to the limits (if not
beyond) the fictitious payee scenario, either way, expanding the application of
BEA s. 20(5) to allocate fraud losses within the drawer’s organization on the
drawer.
Laskin JA’s decision in Teva91 is thus a masterpiece of judge-made law.
Constrained by unfavourable judgments, both as the lack of a duty of care by the
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drawer92 and the interpretation of BEA s. 20(5),93 the Court nevertheless
managed to set its course towards the implementation of sound policies of which
it became persuaded. It did so and allocated the loss onto the corporate drawer
by creatively working within the parameters of existing law, albeit by somewhat
stretching its interpretation.
This is, however, not to say that the law under BEA s. 20(5) has been
successfully established in Teva.94 Inasmuch as Laskin JA moved forward, his
hands were tied by precedent. As well, he did not cover all grounds. To begin
with, he did not address issues concerning the conversion liability of a collecting
bank,95 as well as the effect of an account opened under the business name of a
sole proprietorship.96 These two issues are in fact connected: as I explained in the
Kayani Comment, a cheque payable to a business name of a sole proprietorship is
payable to an existing payee.97 This is true even where the business name was
registered exclusively with a fraudulent intent. Accordingly, no cheque in Teva
was payable to a non-existing payee. In principle this does not preclude treating
all cheques requisitioned and collected by the fraudster as payable to a fictitious
payee — as long as per Laskin JA there was no intent by a drawer’s guiding mind
to pay a legitimate debt to a real creditor. At the same time, it is not all that clear
whether and how BEA s. 20(5) applies to the case where the fraudster is the true
owner of the cheque, albeit with a voidable title, who as such is entitled to collect
the cheque payable to the fraudster’s business name! Had the fraudster made out
cheques payable to himself and collected them, would BEA s. 20(5) be
applicable? I do not think this is different from the situation in Teva98 where
the fraudster made out the cheques payable to his registered business name. True,
a forged endorsement could be made by a named payee who knows the cheque is
meant to be payable to another person with the same name.99 This, however,
seems to be distinguishable from the situation in Teva100 where a payee
fraudulently generates a cheque payable to himself albeit under a business name.
Of course, objections to the availability to the drawer of conversion against
the collecting bank stand also on their own, regardless of the fact that it was
payable to the fraudster’s business name. Thus, a cheque payable to a fictitious
or non-existing payee does not exist as a valuable asset in the drawer’s hands, not
to mention the strict liability in conversion which precludes any consideration of
91
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negligence.101 Finally, in Teva,102 the Court did not critically examine
Falconbridge’s four propositions.103
This is of course not to obscure the fact that in Teva,104 the Ontario Court of
Appeal reached a good result, both in the facts of the case and more in general, in
establishing limits to Boma.105 However, what may prove to be mostly
unwelcome, is that in the process, the meaning of BEA s. 20(5) has been
buried under an avalanche of rules, sub-rules, and distinctions, which may not be
always easily appreciated. My own understanding is that after Teva,106
1. For BEA s. 20(5) to apply, the payee’s name must fraudulently be
inserted with no intention to confer rights on the named payee;
however, it is also required that the payee meets the definition of either
‘non-existing’ or ‘fictitious’ as has been judicially determined.
2. Whether a payee is ‘non-existing’ is objectively determined. Accordingly, a name of a dead person or of an imaginary character, including
a name of any person unrelated to the corporate drawer, is ‘nonexisting’ and BEA s. 20(5) applies so that loss falls on the corporate
drawer. However, according to Boma,107 as understood in Teva, this is
subject to an exception. For this exception to apply, so as to bring the
case outside the ambit of BEA s. 20(5), two cumulative conditions must
be satisfied. First, the payee’s name must be similar to that of a real
person connected to the corporate drawer; typically, and perhaps only,
such a real person with a similar name must be a past or present
creditor. Second, prior to the loss of control of the cheque by the
drawer, a guiding mind in the corporate drawer either viewed or
approved, either the cheque itself, or a list of payees. Where these two
conditions exist, it is ‘plausible’ that the guiding mind was misled to
think that the non-existing payee’s name is of the real creditor with the
similar name. Where this exception applies, loss does not fall on the
corporate drawer.
3. Whether a payee is ‘fictitious’ (so as to have BEA s. 20(5) apply, in
which case the loss falls on the drawer) is determined subjectively,
according to Boma,108 from the point of view of a guiding mind. This
appears to suggest that BEA s. 20(5) applies only where the fraudster is
a guiding mind. However, according to Teva,109 BEA s. 20(5) applies as
101
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well even where the fraudster is not a guiding mind, provided that prior
to the loss of control of the cheque by the drawer no guiding mind can
be said to intend payment to the real creditor. Quare whether
‘intention’ must be actually proved or suffice it to be plausible, and
whether it is plausible where a guiding mind in the corporate drawer
either viewed or approved, either the cheque itself, or the list of payees.
Also quare whether BEA s. 20(5) applies where one guiding mind is the
fraudster and another guiding mind intends to pay the real creditor
having the same name.

This summary appears to inflict a fatal blow on Falconbridge’s four
propositions.110 Neither mere non-existence nor intended fictitiousness gives a
definite answer as to whether BEA s. 20(5) applies. Regardless, one ought to be
overoptimistic to be confident that a subsequent court will find its way in the
maze of rules, exceptions and qualifications. Thus, even if Teva111 demonstrates
the ability of a court to adapt the interpretation of a section to conform to the
right policies, Laskin JA’s judgement also shows the limits to this ability.
In the Kayani Comment I concluded that under the better interpretation,112
for BEA s. 20(5) to apply, what counts is the insertion of a name by way
of pretence merely, ‘‘without any intention that payment shall only be
made in conformity”113 with the cheque. It does not matter whether the
name is of an existing or non-existing person, or to use the statutory
language, ‘‘fictitious or non-existing”.

In a broader perspective, I highlighted the importance of fault in allocating
fraud, including forgery losses.114 I do not think it is too late for the Supreme
Court of Canada to take that route. However, if only with the view of expediting
matters, I have become persuaded that a legislative intervention may become
necessary.
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